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INTRODUCTION
Federal sentencing increasingly differs from sentencing in the states. While 
both systems have shared rising imprisonment rates throughout the last two 
decades, the federal rate has grown more sharply and continues to increase.1
* Professor, Hofstra University School of Law; B.A., Bates College; J.D., Yale Law 
School; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Dan Wilhelm for his 
insights into state sentencing practice, to Marc Miller for thoughtful comments on the issues, 
and to Ron Wright and Steve Chanenson for valuable feedback on an earlier draft. My 
special thanks for research assistance go to Hofstra’s reference and government documents 
librarian Patricia Kasting and my research assistant Sarah Balgley. 
1. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON AND 
JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2004, at 2-4 & tbls.1-2 (2005) (stating that between 1995 and 
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States have developed some strategies to combat the growing costs of prisons, 
which have been fueled by the imprisonment of nonviolent drug offenders, 
lengthened sentences for violent offenders, and the return to prison of those 
who violated parole and supervised release conditions.2 Increasingly, some 
states have diverted offenders who pose a low risk to public safety to nonprison 
sanctions.3 The federal regime, however, currently permits and offers only a 
few nonprison options. 
In 2003, 83.3% of all defendants sentenced in federal court were sent to 
prison.4 More than half of those receiving nonprison terms were sentenced to 
probation, while almost 5% received a split probation/confinement sentence 
and 3% received a prison/community split sentence.5 The small number of 
nonprison-bound offenders may explain the relative inattention that has been 
paid to nonprison sentences in the federal system. However, as judges may be 
able to use their increased discretion in a post-Booker world, the use of 
nonprison sentences could increase. The danger of unguided discretion in this 
area coupled with the budget cutbacks in the federal prison system should 
provide an incentive for the judiciary and Congress to explore greater use of 
nonprison sentencing options.6 The expansion of nonprison punishments and 
guidelines regarding their imposition would allow judges to individualize 
sanctions while protecting public safety. 
Nonprison sanctions have been one avenue for the states to limit prison 
2004, the federal correctional population increased annually by an average of 7.8%, while 
the states added 2.7% inmates per year), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim04.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
2. DANIEL F. WILHELM & NICHOLAS R. TURNER, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IS THE BUDGET 
CRISIS CHANGING THE WAY WE LOOK AT SENTENCING AND INCARCERATION? (2002),
http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/167_263.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005); see PAIGE M.
HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2002, at 10 
(2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p02.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
3. See, e.g., Richard P. Kern & Meredith Farrar-Owens, Sentencing Guidelines with 
Integrated Offender Risk Assessment, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 165-66 (2004) (describing 
Virginia’s risk-based diversion program). 
4. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 2003, 
at 29 fig.D (2005) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK], http://www. 
ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2003/SBTOC03.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2005). The percentage of 
federal offenders sent to prison increased from 54% to 72% from fiscal year 1988 to fiscal 
year 1999. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRISONER RELEASES: TRENDS AND INFORMATION
ON REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS 12 (2001). 
5. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 29 fig.D (showing 
that 9.0% received probation; 4.7% probation and confinement; 3.0% prison and community 
split). In addition, 775 individuals received neither prison nor probation sentences. Id.
6. See, e.g., Harley G. Lappin, Message from the Director, in STATE OF THE BUREAU 
2003: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND GOALS 3 (Fed. Bureau of Prisons ed., 2003) (noting resource 
constraints amidst increasing number of inmates and other obligations), http://www.bop.gov/ 
news/PDFs/sob03.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005); Todd Bussert & Joel Sickler, Bureau of 
Prisons Update: More Beds, Less Rehabilitation, CHAMPION, Mar. 2005, at 42 (discussing 
savings measures “to reduce costs due to continuing budget cutbacks”). At the end of 2003, 
federal prisons operated at 39% above capacity. HARRISON & BECK, supra note 1, at 1. 
DEMLEITNER SMART PUBLIC POLICY NONPRISON SENTENCES 58 STAN. L. REV. 339 10/28/2005 1:47:46 PM 
October 2005] SMART PUBLIC POLICY: NONPRISON SENTENCES 341
growth. Because of the large number of individuals released annually from 
confinement,7 states have begun to use reentry assistance to help released 
offenders readjust into society. This has proven difficult, in part because of the 
vast panoply of often-mandatory restrictions imposed on ex-offenders. These 
so-called “collateral sanctions” run the gamut from disenfranchisement to the 
denial of welfare benefits. While the states impose a number of such sanctions, 
other sanctions result from congressional legislation. These sanctions impact 
federal and state offenders and frequently pose a substantial hurdle to 
reintegration.8 Some sanctions are justified based on public safety grounds; 
others are merely retributive, even vengeful. Many are neither imposed in open 
court nor subjected to a proportionality analysis. In light of congressional 
funding for reentry programs, legislation that counters reentry efforts should be 
curtailed. Instead, collateral sanctions can usefully be integrated into the 
framework of nonprison sentences. They should be based on individualized 
assessments akin to other aspects of a criminal sanction, imposed as part of the 
sentence, and narrowly restricted so as not to interfere with the difficult process 
of reintegration. These changes would allow some collateral sanctions to 
complement a nonprison sanction or, in some cases, to stand on their own. 
In Part I, this Article will focus on intermediate sanctions. It will highlight 
the limited availability of such sanctions in the federal system and then propose 
a set of options to increase nonprison sanctions. Part II will focus on the 
panoply of collateral sanctions and the impact of congressional legislation on 
the reintegration of state and federal offenders. As collateral sanctions could 
become an integral and effective part of a sentence, the Article will conclude 
with a set of prescriptions for the effective use of collateral sanctions in the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines regime. 
I. EXPANDING AND REGULATING INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS
Nonprison sentences include confinement and nonconfinement options. In 
the 1970s, the latter were referred to as “alternatives to imprisonment,” while 
today all nonprison sanctions tend to be labeled “intermediate sanctions” to 
capture their mid-level severity, which falls between probation and 
imprisonment.9 Ideally, any sentencing regime would have a continuum of 
sanctions ranging from the least to the most restrictive, all roughly 
proportionate to the seriousness of the crime. The Federal Guidelines, however, 
currently offer only very limited options for intermediate sanctions. 
7. Jeremy Travis, But They All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry, 7 SENT’G &
CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR 21ST CENTURY, May 2000, at 1, 1, http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/ 
nij/181413.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
8. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions 
on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (1999). 
9. MICHAEL TONRY, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES 3 (1997), http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/165043.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
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A. Intermediate Sanctions in the Federal Guidelines
The Guidelines’ Sentencing Table consists of a horizontal axis detailing an 
offender’s criminal history category, ranging from I to VI and measured in 
“criminal history points,” and a vertical axis, with offense levels from 1 to 43.10
Offense levels are determined based on the type of offense committed—the 
base offense—and offense specific characteristics and adjustments.11 The 
intersection of the two axes provides the sentencing range measured in months 
of imprisonment. Up to Offense Level 8, an offender with Criminal History 
Category I falls into Zone A, which allows for a probation-only sentence. The 
possibility of a probation-only sentence decreases for offenders who have prior 
criminal records, so that an offender with a criminal history in Category VI—
the highest criminal history category under the Guidelines—may only receive 
probation if his offense is at Offense Level 1.12
Zone B allows for a split sentence with some confinement but is only 
available up to Offense Level 10 for those in the lowest criminal history 
category and up to Offense Level 6 for those in the highest criminal history 
category.13 Finally, Zone C mandates imprisonment, but offenders may serve 
up to half of their minimum sentence in alternative confinement. This zone tops 
out at Offense Level 12 for those offenders with the shortest criminal history 
and with Offense Level 5 for those in Criminal History Category VI. 
Mandatory minimum sentences trump the Guidelines and make it impossible 
for a court to impose a nonprison sanction. 
The Sentencing Table indicates the limited availability of nonprison 
sanctions for those offenders sentenced within the applicable Guidelines range. 
Many of the offenders sentenced within Zones A or B, however, do not receive 
probation or intermediate sanctions. Of 58,463 cases for which the Commission 
had completed files in 2003, approximately one-sixth of the offenders were 
eligible for a nonprison sentence.14 Less than two-thirds of them received such 
a sentence. The likelihood of a nonprison sentence declines dramatically as 
offenders move from Zone A into the other zones. Only 42% of Zone C 
offenders received a nonprison sanction, and approximately 5% of those in 
Zone D—the presumptive imprisonment zone—did.15
10. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A (2004). 
11. Id. § 1B1.1. 
12. Id.
13. Confinement must take place in a nonprison setting. House arrest with electronic 
monitoring, for example, has been extended since the early 1990s, when the technology 
became available. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING 44
(2004) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT], http://www.ussc.gov 
/15_year/15year.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
14. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 37 fig.F (finding 
that 10,093 cases fell into Zones A or B). 
15. Id. at 36 tbl.16. 
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The likelihood of an offender receiving a nonprison sentence depends not 
only on the number of offense levels, but also on the type of offense for which 
he was convicted and his background. While only 20% of larceny offenders 
received a prison sentence, almost 90% of immigration offenders did.16 Most 
of the latter were noncitizens with immigration detainers. Noncitizen offenders 
generally are not eligible for nonprison sanctions and early release programs 
and frequently experience harsher sanctions for that reason. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Booker,17 in which the Court declared the 
Federal Guidelines to be advisory only, may change sentence disposition. Data 
available as of six months after the decision indicate, however, that this is not 
(yet?) the case.18 Sentence type as well as sentence length appear remarkably 
stable, although intercircuit variations may increase after the Court’s decision. 
The most lenient sentence available under the Federal Guidelines is 
probation. Under the federal system, fines are not recognized as a separate, 
noncustodial sentencing option, in contrast to many state guidelines systems. In 
the federal system, fines can only be imposed as part of a probation, 
intermediate, or confinement sanction. 
The total number of offenders who received straight probation has declined 
by over two-thirds since the pre-Guidelines period.19 While the Commission 
considers this change to be due, to some extent, to white-collar offenders now 
receiving split sentences, firearm and drug traffickers are also more likely to be 
sentenced to prison than such offenders were in the past.20 These numbers 
should be viewed in light of state data and international comparisons. In 1999, 
for example, Germany sentenced 80% of those convicted to a fine, and only 
about 6% to prison.21
The availability of intermediate sanctions under the Guidelines is limited. 
Courts may employ certain forms of confinement either as probation conditions 
or as prison replacements. Community confinement, which falls into the former 
category, can consist of residence in a drug-treatment facility, a halfway house, 
16. Id. at 37 fig.F (showing that in Zones A and B prison sanctions were imposed in 
about 36% of the fraud cases, 38% of the embezzlement cases, 42% of the drug-trafficking 
cases, 58% of the simple drug possession cases, 30% of the firearms and forgery cases, and 
28% of all remaining cases). 
17. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
18. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT 13 (Aug. 3, 
2005) (showing the distribution of offenders receiving sentencing options for the most 
frequently applied Guidelines), http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker_080805.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2005). 
19. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 13, at 43 fig.2.2. 
20. Id. at vi, viii-ix. 
21. FED. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR & FED. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, FIRST PERIODICAL 
REPORT ON CRIME AND CRIME CONTROL IN GERMANY 33 (2001), http://www.uni-konstanz.de 
/rtf/ki/Download_Abridged_Version.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). These data are, of 
course, difficult to compare with federal sentencing data, as most foreign criminal justice 
systems do not make a federal-state distinction in their disposition of criminal cases. 
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or a similar center.22 Home detention, on the other hand, is only available as a 
replacement for imprisonment.23 Other conditions include community service24
and occupational restrictions designed to protect the public.25 Some sentencing 
components are available independent of the type of confinement imposed. 
These include an order of notice to fraud victims26 and the denial of federal 
benefits to drug traffickers and possessors.27 In addition, judges are mandated 
to impose restitution orders on defendants, regardless of their ability to pay.28
In contrast to many state and foreign systems that allow for fines, 
restitution orders, and community service as stand-alone sanctions,29 the 
Federal Guidelines permit them only as part of a probation sentence. The 
federal criminal justice system only offers limited forms of alternative 
sanctions. Among the notable omissions are intensive probation with enhanced 
supervision of offenders and day fines that are based directly on the gravity of 
the offense and an offender’s economic situation.30
Offenders in Zone C and some in Zone D are eligible for shock 
incarceration,31 more commonly called “boot camp.” These programs require 
strict discipline but allow offenders, upon completion, to serve the remainder of 
22. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5F1.1, cmt. nn.1-2 (2004). 
23. Id. § 5F1.2, cmt. nn.1-3. 
24. Id. § 5F1.3. The Manual suggests a maximum of 400 hours of community service. 
Id. § 5F1.3, cmt. n.1. 
25. Id. § 5F1.5. 
26. Id. § 5F1.4, cmt. background. 
27. Id. § 5F1.6. Courts have taken very limited advantage of this provision. The denial 
has been largely ineffective because of administrative hurdles. See GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, DRUG CONTROL: DIFFICULTIES IN DENYING FEDERAL BENEFITS TO CONVICTED DRUG
OFFENDERS (1992); Robert W. Musser, Jr., Denial of Federal Benefits to Drug Traffickers 
and Drug Possessors: A Broad-Reaching but Seldom Used Sanction, 12 FED. SENT’G REP.
252 (2000). After a third drug conviction, the benefit denial is mandatory unless certain 
exceptions apply. See 21 U.S.C. § 862(a)(1)(C), (b)(2), (c), & (e) (2005); see also infra Part 
II (discussing collateral sanctions). 
28. Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 204(a), 110 
Stat. 1227 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2005)); 18 U.S.C. § 
3664(f)(1)(A) (2005)). For a discussion of whether restitution orders are a criminal or a civil 
sanction, see Brian Kleinhaus, Note, Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the Criminal or Civil 
Nature of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the 
Abatement Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2711 (2005). 
29. Some systems even allow courts to dispense with punishment upon a guilty verdict. 
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9723 (2005) (entitled “Determination of guilt without further 
penalty”). This sentence, however, is likely to be imposed only in conjunction with penalties 
on other counts. Personal Communication with Professor Steven Chanenson, Member, 
Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission (May 28, 2005). 
30. See generally GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SENTENCING: INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS 
IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (1994) [hereinafter GAO, SENTENCING:
INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS]. For a discussion of day fines, see infra note 103 and 
accompanying text. 
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582(a), 3621(b)(4), 4046 (2005); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5F1.7 (2004). 
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their sentences in nonprison confinement.32 The program has been relatively 
small, with only about 750 prisoners annually—out of more than 170,000.33
The Bureau of Prisons is in the process of closing all boot camps, also called 
“Intensive Confinement Centers,” on cost grounds.34 Some federal judges and 
members of Congress have opposed the decision.35
This opposition may be surprising, as research on boot camps has shown 
that they have failed to live up to expectations; most importantly, they did not 
lead to a perceptible decrease in recidivism. The boot camps’ failure may not 
have been preordained, but may have been due in part to the divergent goals 
they were meant to serve.36
Judicial opposition to the abolition of boot camps should be read in the 
context of the findings in a 2003 judicial survey, which indicated that most 
judges oppose restrictions to the availability of nonprison alternatives.37 The 
survey indicates that almost half of all district court judges demanded greater 
access to nonprison sentences for drug-trafficking offenders to meet the goals 
of punishment set out in the Sentencing Reform Act. Only a slightly smaller 
number of district court judges expressed the same desire for theft, larceny, 
embezzlement, and fraud offenders. For the remaining offenses, approximately 
a third of all district judges would like to see expanded probation and split-
sentence options.38 Without such options, the current sentence regime fails to 
accomplish its retributive, deterrent, and rehabilitative goals. 
B. Prerequisites for Successful Nonprison Sentences: Proportionality, Public 
Safety, and Effectiveness
Even though annual reports indicate that the United States now has the 
highest per capita imprisonment rate in the world and that the federal system is 
the largest jailer in the United States—with the highest growth rate in recent 
years39—why does this development necessitate the adoption of more 
nonprison sanctions? Imprisonment falls disproportionately on the shoulders of 
minority communities, excludes offenders from economic and political 
32. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5F1.7, cmt. background (2004) (citing 
BOP operations memorandum). 
33. Bussert & Sickler, supra note 6, at 43. 
34. Id. at 42. 
35. Id. at 42-43. 
36. See, e.g., DALE G. PARENT, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL BOOT CAMPS:
LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF RESEARCH 1 (2003), http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/197018. 
pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
37. LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT: SURVEY OF 
ARTICLE III JUDGES ON THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES ES-5 (2003), http://www.ussc. 
gov/judsurv/execsum.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
38. Id. at ES-5 to ES-6. 
39. HARRISON & BECK, supra note 1, at 1-2. 
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participation, and loosens prisoners’ relationships with families and 
communities.40 While prison may not necessarily function as a “crime school,” 
it destroys many of the connections an offender ultimately needs to regain his 
place in society.41
Nonprison sentences, on the other hand, allow—and even require—
individuals to be employed, pay fines and make restitution, pay taxes, and 
assist their families.42 Such demands are crucial to allowing them to regain 
their place in society. 
While intermediate sanctions hold the promise of successful reintegration 
and cost savings, they are not a magic bullet. Existing analyses indicate that 
intermediate sanctions do not reduce criminal behavior, but neither does 
imprisonment.43 Research has shown that nonprison sanctions cannot 
“simultaneously . . . divert offenders from incarceration, reduce recidivism 
rates, and save money.”44 For that reason, many nonprison sanctions appear to 
be failing. Cost savings, for example, are only feasible as long as judges divert 
offenders from prisons rather than sentence otherwise probation-bound 
offenders to intermediate sanctions.45 Instead of diverting offenders from 
prison, alternatives may be used in addition to (rather than instead of) 
probationary sentences, which will lead to the so-called “net-widening.”46
Even without net-widening, some alternatives with enhanced supervision 
have proven more costly than originally envisioned. They have led to the 
discovery of a greater number of minor violations that have resulted in 
immediate incarceration.47
40. For a discussion of the justifications for imprisonment and negative individual and 
societal consequences of high imprisonment rates, see Ben Trachtenberg, State Sentencing 
Policy and New Prison Admissions, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 479, 522-30 (2005). 
41. Id. at 524-26; see also JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE 
AND PRISONER REENTRY 223-26 (2003) (discussing “criminogenic or contagion effects of 
prisons”).
42. Cf. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: COMMUNITY-
BASED CORRECTIONAL PROGRAMS COULD BE MORE EXTENSIVELY USED WITHIN THE 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3-4 (1982) (describing savings in Oregon and Georgia 
because of alternative sentences, which allowed individuals to be employed or engage in 
compulsory public-service work). 
43. PAULA SMITH ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF PRISON SENTENCES AND INTERMEDIATE
SANCTIONS ON RECIDIVISM: GENERAL EFFECTS AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 2002-01, at ii 
(2002), http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/corrections/200201_Gendreau_e.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
44. TONRY, supra note 9, at 2. 
45. See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTENSIVE PROBATION SUPERVISION: COST-
SAVINGS RELATIVE TO INCARCERATION (1993) (documenting cost savings of intensive 
probation programs in Maricopa and Pima counties, Arizona). 
46. This has occurred—by design—in the federal system. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 13, at 44. 
47. TONRY, supra note 9, at 2, 9-10; see also KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE 
SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 198-99 (2d ed. 
2004). For changes in state approaches to this issue, see JON WOOL & DON STEMEN, VERA 
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In light of these problems, three issues are crucial for the development of a 
system of nonincarcerative sanctions for federal sentencing. First, the sanctions 
must be sufficiently, but not excessively, retributive so as to be roughly 
proportionate to the offense committed and must function as an effective 
deterrent. Judges confronted with the choice between straight probation and 
prison often choose the latter because they find probation to fulfill neither 
goal.48 Judges must be able to choose from a more extensive list of 
intermediate sanctions. 
However, judges will take advantage of these options as an alternative to 
imprisonment only if they no longer view imprisonment as their first choice. 
This appears to be the major difference between the United States and Europe 
in sentencing. Europe’s imprisonment rate is dramatically lower than that of the 
United States not only because more intermediate sanctions are available, but 
also because the public and courts view imprisonment as a sentence of last 
resort.49 Even though the American public has displayed a very punitive 
attitude during the last few decades, public opinion polls have increasingly 
indicated growing support for rehabilitative measures and for greater judicial 
freedom in choosing sentences.50
Second, nonincarcerative sanctions may not endanger the public 
unnecessarily. No nonprison sanction can guarantee the same level of safety as 
imprisonment,51 but such sanctions may be imposed on offenders who pose 
only a slight risk of committing a serious offense. Risk-assessment tools may 
help determine the potential for recidivism. The U.S. Parole Commission has 
INST. OF JUSTICE, CHANGING FORTUNES OR CHANGING ATTITUDES? SENTENCING AND 
CORRECTIONS REFORMS IN 2003, at 6 (2004), http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/ 226_431. 
pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). Additional problems, including the small size of 
intermediate sanctions programs, are described in GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERMEDIATE 
SANCTIONS: THEIR IMPACTS ON PRISON CROWDING, COSTS, AND RECIDIVISM ARE STILL 
UNCLEAR 19-29 (1990) [hereinafter GAO, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS]. For federal 
approaches to violations of probation and supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2005). 
48. For a discussion of the importance of purpose in imposing probation conditions, 
see Wayne A. Logan, The Importance of Purpose in Probation Decision Making, 7 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 171 (2003). 
49. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Why Aren’t German Penal Policies Harsher and 
Imprisonment Rates Higher?, 5 GERMAN L.J. 1187, 1199, 1202 (2005) (discussing 
International Crime Victim Survey responses indicating dramatic national preferences for 
imprisonment in the United States and the United Kingdom); Thomas Weigend, Sentencing 
and Punishment in Germany, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 188, 
194-201 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001) (outlining intermediate sanctions 
available in Germany). Michael Tonry cautions that American concerns with proportionality 
drive ever more severe sentences. “If punitive literalism governs, the range for substitution 
between prison and community penalties is tiny.” Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, 
Intermediate Sanctions, 20 CRIME & JUST. 99, 136 (1996). 
50. PETERSILIA, supra note 41, at 231-35.
51. See GAO, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS, supra note 47, at 45-46; see also Tonry & 
Lynch, supra note 49, at 104-05. 
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developed a risk-assessment tool to decide on parole release.52 Increasingly, 
state parole commissions use risk-assessment instruments in release 
decisionmaking.53 Some states have begun to use risk-assessment tools at 
sentencing to determine whether a particular offender should be diverted from 
prison. Virginia has developed the most extensive and detailed risk-assessment 
score, leading to the diversion of low-level drug and property offenders.54
Virginia’s sentencing commission developed a risk score by adding up 
eleven factors listed on the risk-assessment instrument. The higher the total 
score, the more likely the offender will commit further offenses.55 The best 
predictors of recidivism in Virginia were gender and prior record. The 
determination of the cutoff point for a diversion recommendation is a policy 
choice that impacts cost savings.56 Virginia’s judges are not mandated to 
follow the commission’s recommendation but should consider the total risk 
score in setting a sentence.57
While many judges already consider prior offense type and prior record in 
determining an offender’s sentence, such decisions are frequently 
impressionistic. In contrast, Virginia’s model applies a statistical classification 
to determine an offender’s future risk. Such actuarial risk assessment allows for 
more principled decisionmaking, less discretion, and better predictability of 
sentences and resource use.58 Nevertheless, the nonmandatory character of the 
grouping allows judges to use the actuarial risk assessment merely as a guide. 
The Federal Guidelines’ prior criminal history score implies such a risk 
assessment and is largely predictive of recidivism.59 It can therefore serve as 
52. See, e.g., Peter B. Hoffman, Twenty Years of Operational Use of a Risk Prediction 
Instrument: The United States Parole Commission’s Salient Factors Score, 22 J. CRIM. JUST.
477 (1994); Peter B. Hoffman & James Beck, The Origin of the Federal Criminal History 
Score, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 192 (1997) (discussing Salient Factor Score).  
53. See, e.g., TEX. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, REVISED PAROLE GUIDELINES (2005), 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/new_parole_guidelines/new_parole_guidelines.html (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2005); Letter from Board of Parole Commissioners, State of Nevada, to 
Legislative Council Bureau (Feb. 2, 2005) (on file with author) (discussing adoption of risk 
assessment methodology for parole release decisionmaking). Risk assessment is used 
particularly frequently for sex offenders. See Kern & Farrar-Owens, supra note 3, at 166-68; 
Philip H. Witt & Natalie Barone, Assessing Sex Offender Risk: New Jersey’s Methods, 16 
FED. SENT’G REP. 170 (2004). 
54. See Kern & Farrar-Owens, supra note 3, at 165-66; see also BRIAN J. OSTROM ET 
AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA (2002), 
http://www.vcsc.state.va.us/risk_off_rpt.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
55. OSTROM ET AL., supra note 54, at 6. 
56. Id. at 29. 
57. Id. at 15. 
58. Id. at 28-29. 
59. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY 
COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2004) [hereinafter U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM], http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/Recidivism_ 
General.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
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the starting point for a Virginia-style risk-prediction model. The use of some 
factors, however, may be disputed. Demographic factors, especially gender and 
age, often help in assessing the likelihood of recidivism.60 Congress, however, 
has mandated that sentencing be neutral as to gender,61 and the Commission 
has determined that only old age and infirmity may play a role at sentencing.62
The extent to which such factors should be considered in a risk-assessment 
score should be subject to a debate that examines not only their value as risk 
predictors, but also larger societal goals, such as sex equality. 
Finally, alternative sanctions must be effective. A 2005 study by the 
Government Accountability Office indicated, for example, that the government 
had collected only about $40 million from a number of individuals convicted of 
white-collar fraud offenses who had been sentenced to pay a total of $568 
million to their victims. Substantial further collections seemed unlikely, in part 
due to administrative inefficiencies and in part due to fraud.63 Were restitution 
in these cases the only penalty, the public would conclude that such punishment 
is ineffective and deceptive, akin to the public reaction to indeterminate 
sentencing. This response would likely lead to a more punitive method of 
punishment, and a move away from intermediate sanctions.64 For that reason, 
only intermediate sanctions whose completion can be effectively implemented 
and monitored should be imposed. Courts must be provided with a host of 
available responses in the case of offender noncompliance with the 
intermediate sanction, ranging from immediate incarceration for the remaining 
sentence to a warning.65
C. Expanding Eligible Offender Groups
As states have confronted the growth of prison populations, they have 
adopted a host of strategies to cut prison costs. Those designed to divert low-
level offenders have included the abolition of mandatory minimums and 
adoption of treatment programs for nonviolent drug offenders.66 The legislative 
60. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 54, at 11-12. 
61. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2005); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 
(2004).
62. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1 (2004). 
63. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CRIMINAL DEBT: COURT-ORDERED RESTITUTION 
AMOUNTS FAR EXCEED LIKELY COLLECTIONS FOR THE CRIME VICTIMS IN SELECTED 
FINANCIAL FRAUD CASES (2005) (detailing five case studies), http://www.gao.gov/htext/ 
d0580.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
64. Cf. John Raine et al., Financial Penalties: Who Pays, Who Doesn’t and Why Not?,
43 HOWARD L.J. 518, 518-19 (2004) (discussing English reaction to nonpayment of fines). 
65. Cf. Julian V. Roberts, Evaluating the Pluses and Minuses of Custody: Sentencing 
Reform in England and Wales, 42 HOWARD J. CRIM. JUST. 229, 237 (2003) (discussing 
options available to Canadian judges).  
66. See, e.g., WOOL & STEMEN, supra note 47, at 6-7; Fox Butterfield, With Cash 
Tight, States Reassess Long Jail Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at A1 (discussing 
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and guidelines strategies appropriate for the federal system should target 
specific offender groups and mandatory sentences. Federal offenders differ 
from state offenders in some crucial ways. In fiscal year 2003, over one-third of 
all federal offenders were sentenced for drug offenses, followed by 
immigration offenses. Fraud and firearms offenders each constituted about one-
tenth of federal offenders.67 Demographically, state and federal offenders also 
differ, with federal prisons housing slightly more women and better educated 
inmates, and substantially more older and Hispanic inmates than their state 
counterparts.68
1. Abolishing mandatory minimum drug sentences
In recent years a number of states have reduced or even abolished 
mandatory drug sentences, as such sentences had proven too expensive because 
they led to the incarceration of low-risk offenders.69 Some states give judges 
discretion to divert offenders to probation when drug or alcohol abuse was a 
contributing factor to an offense.70 This approach allows for the 
individualization of sentences, in contrast with the Federal Guidelines, which 
declare that drug or alcohol abuse is not a reason for a downward departure.71
Congress has passed a number of mandatory minimum sentences 
governing drug offenses. The best known are the mandatory minimum 
sentences for powder and crack cocaine.72 Courts cannot sentence an offender 
below a mandatory minimum unless the offender fits under the so-called 
“safety valve.”73 In 2000, courts took advantage of this provision in more than 
Kansas law that mandates drug treatment instead of prison for first-time, nonviolent drug 
offenders).
67. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 13 fig.A. In 2004, 
immigration offenses displaced drug offenses as the primary offense category in federal 
court. The percentage of state drug offenders is slightly below one-third; property offenses 
make up approximately another third of all state offenses, and violent crimes about nineteen 
percent. Only about three percent of all state felony convictions in 2002 were for weapon 
offenses. MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 2002: STATISTICAL TABLES, at 6 tbl.1.1
(2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/scscf02.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
68. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL OFFENDERS STATISTICS, http://www.ojp. 
usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm (last visited May 16, 2005). 
69. WOOL & STEMEN, supra note 47, at 6-7, 10-11. 
70. Id. at 7-8 (describing Indiana’s approach). 
71. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 (2004). For a comprehensive set 
of options for dealing with drug offenders, see MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N,
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON DRUG OFFENDER SENTENCING ISSUES 74-75 (2004). 
72. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2005). 
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2005). For a discussion of the “safety valve” and its 
impact, see Michael Edmund O’Neill, Abraham’s Legacy: An Empirical Assessment of 
(Nearly) First-Time Offenders in the Federal System, 42 B.C. L. REV. 291, 331-39 (2004). 
 Another avenue for a sentence below the mandatory minimum is through a government 
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one-third of all powder cocaine cases, but only in about fifteen percent of crack 
cocaine cases.74 The abolition or limitation of mandatory minimums would 
allow a larger number of offenders to be sentenced to nonprison punishments.75
Many of them may be eligible for a treatment-based sentence instead of jail (as 
is mandated in California and Arizona76), possibly in conjunction with some 
form of detention.77
Moreover, restrictions on mandatory minimum sentences should be 
combined with recidivism risk assessments before an offender is diverted from 
prison. These assessments should be based not only on criminal history, but 
also on demographic factors, including family obligations and age. 
2. Factoring in recidivism risks
As the incapacitation of dangerous recidivists has become a goal of 
sentencing reform,78 nondangerous offenders may merit a nonprison sanction. 
According to the Sentencing Commission’s data, for example, older offenders 
show a decreased recidivism risk as compared to younger offenders.79 As they 
constitute a large financial burden,80 older offenders might be a primary target 
group for nonincarcerative sanctions. The same holds true for parents, 
especially those of young children. 
Even though the Commission found that the recidivism risk of women in 
lower criminal history categories does not vary dramatically from that of men, 
it remains lower.81 Existing data indicate that women’s lower recidivism rate 
motion. The court may impose a sentence below a mandatory minimum when the 
government makes a substantial assistance motion to that effect.  
74. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 60 (2002), http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/02crack/Ch4.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
75. The expansion of the safety-valve provision may accomplish similar results, as it is 
likely that some of its criteria—especially a low criminal history score—would also be part 
of a judge’s decision whether to release an individual. However, the abolition of mandatory 
minimum sentences would achieve larger systemic goals, remedy existing disparities, and 
restrict prosecutorial power. 
76. Ariz. Prop. 200 (Nov. 1996); Cal. Prop. 36 (Nov. 2000). 
77. For an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of various sentencing options 
for drug offenders, see GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONFRONTING THE DRUG PROBLEM:
DEBATE PERSISTS ON ENFORCEMENT AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 34-39 (1993). 
78. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d), 1170.12(b) (West 2004) (California’s three-
strikes law); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084 (West 2004). 
79. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 59, at 12, 28 
exhb.9.
80. Cf. RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AGING BEHIND 
BARS: “THREE STRIKES” SEVEN YEARS LATER (2001) (detailing costs to California’s prison 
system from incarcerating increasingly older inmates under the state’s three-strikes law), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/9087.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
81. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 59, at 11, 28 
exhb.9.
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may be connected to their family and childcare responsibilities. Those should 
also be a reason for considering women—and men with such responsibilities—
for nonprison sanctions. 
More than half of the women incarcerated in federal prisons have children, 
and more than eighty percent of them lived with their children prior to 
incarceration.82 Because of the sparseness of federal women’s prisons, most of 
the women are housed far from their families, making it more difficult for them 
to stay in regular, close contact with their children.83 Longer prison terms often 
automatically end parental rights.84 On the other hand, children of incarcerated 
parents are more likely to experience a host of negative consequences, 
including a greater likelihood of going to prison themselves.85
Since many of the offenders with young children also constitute lower 
recidivism risks in light of their offense of conviction and their prior criminal 
records, sentencing judges should at least be allowed to consider the impact of 
a prison sentence on families and minor children. For that reason, more 
offenders with heavy family responsibilities, and especially those with minor 
children, should be eligible for intermediate sanctions.86
3. Noncitizen offenders
Noncitizen offenders frequently receive prison sentences and are precluded 
from halfway-house placements because of their citizenship status, which 
makes them a greater flight risk.87 Immigration detainment and the possibility 
of deportation make it unlikely that they will be released on probation or even 
to nonprison confinement options. The flight risk, however, may not be equally 
high for all of them, and alternatives to confinement may exist. 
82. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INCARCERATED 
PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 2-3 (2000) (noting that while over sixty percent of all men 
incarcerated in federal prisons have children, only slightly over half lived with them at the 
time of their arrest), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 
2005). For a general discussion of women offenders in the criminal justice system, see 
Myrna S. Raeder, A Primer on Gender-Related Issues that Affect Female Offenders, 20 
CRIM. JUST. 4 (2005). 
83. See, e.g., MUMOLA, supra note 82, at 5 (detailing amount of contact between 
incarcerated parents and their children). 
84. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Philip M. Genty, Damage
to Family Relationships as a Collateral Consequence of Parental Incarceration, 30 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1671, 1678 (2003). 
85. See Raeder, supra note 82, at 5-7; see also PETERSILIA, supra note 41, at 227-28. 
86. California’s Little Hoover Commission has suggested an increase in community 
confinement for women. LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, BREAKING THE BARRIERS FOR WOMEN ON 
PAROLE 48-49 (2004), http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/177/report177.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 
2005).
87. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRISONER RELEASES: TRENDS AND INFORMATION ON 
REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS 22 (2001). 
DEMLEITNER SMART PUBLIC POLICY NONPRISON SENTENCES 58 STAN. L. REV. 339 10/28/2005 1:47:46 PM 
October 2005] SMART PUBLIC POLICY: NONPRISON SENTENCES 353
In the 1990s, the Vera Institute of Justice, upon request of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, ran a supervision program for noncitizens in 
removal proceedings. Rather than incarcerating these individuals, which was 
costly, or releasing them with little supervision, which led to an appearance rate 
of 50%, the Vera Institute implemented a community supervision program that 
was cheaper than incarceration and led to a 90% appearance rate.88 The 
program was especially successful for noncitizens who were awaiting removal 
hearings because of a criminal conviction. Nevertheless, the final removal rates 
were only around 50%, while imprisonment of these noncitizen offenders 
would have presumably allowed for the deportation of all of them. 
Program modifications are possible, though, to increase the effectiveness 
of nonprison sanctions for noncitizens.89 In light of the promise held out by the 
Appearance Program, noncitizens should not be automatically precluded from 
participation in intermediate sentences. They may be particularly suited for 
custodial confinement or an enhanced supervision program. Currently, 
however, the federal system offers only limited sentencing options for such 
offenders.
D. Integrating Nonprison Sentences into a Guidelines Regime
Guidelines regimes are based on promises of predictability, uniformity, and 
truth in sentencing. Intermediate sentences can become part of such a system as 
long as judges are provided with guidelines that encompass an array of 
available, effective, and well-publicized intermediate sanctions. 
1. Zones of discretion and categorical exceptions
As some of the state guidelines systems demonstrate, intermediate 
sanctions and sentencing guidelines are compatible.90 The most successful 
integration models are zones of discretion and categorical exceptions. The 
Federal Guidelines exemplify the former—in a rather limited version, however. 
Many state guidelines provide judges with broader zones of discretion and with 
more sentencing options than the federal system.91 Categorical exceptions 
allow judges to disregard otherwise applicable guidelines for certain types of 
offenders. Oregon, for example, allows judges to disregard guidelines for first 
88. EILEEN SULLIVAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, TESTING COMMUNITY 
SUPERVISION FOR THE INS: AN EVALUATION OF THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 1-3 
(2000), http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/aapfinal.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
89. Id. at 6. 
90. Pennsylvania’s guidelines, which allow restorative sanctions or restrictive 
intermediate punishments to replace incarceration, represent one example. PA. COMM’N ON 
SENTENCING, SENTENCING GUIDELINES IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL, tit. 204, pt. VIII, § 
303.11 (6th ed. June 3, 2005), http://pcs.la.psu.edu (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
91. TONRY, supra note 9, at xiii. 
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offenders who committed a nonviolent, nonsexual offense. Other exceptions 
apply to certain sex offenders who are amenable to treatment.92
Less successful have been the concepts of punishment units—which allow 
a conversion of all sanctions into generic units—and exchange rates—which 
establish a ratio between days in prison and days in alternative confinement. 
Oregon and Pennsylvania both failed in their efforts to implement punishment 
units.93 These systems will consistently falter as long as prisons remain the 
norm and all other punishments must be equally oppressive.94 In this respect, 
the United States differs from countries like Germany where the norm is a fine, 
making any other sanctions appear more oppressive. This system leads to a 
leveling down rather than a leveling up of sanctions. To avoid a further 
escalation of harshness in federal sentencing, an expansion of existing zone of 
discretion systems might be most effective, combined with an expansion of the 
types of intermediate sanctions available. 
2. Expanding the availability of intermediate sanctions
Even though judges currently have the opportunity to impose nonprison 
sanctions, they frequently do not take advantage of it. In an early Guidelines 
study, the General Accounting Office attempted to determine why judges do 
not employ intermediate sanctions even when such sanctions are available to 
them. Among the reasons given were the absence of certain resources, such as 
halfway houses, in the district; the Sentencing Commission’s recommendation 
against community confinement for offenders with a criminal history category 
of III or higher;95 and the offender’s prior failure on probation or in a 
community-based sanction.96 Judges viewed yet another group of offenders, 
noncitizens, as possible flight risks because of the threat of deportation.97 Many 
of these concerns may be counteracted through effective nonprison sanctions.98
Congress funds a wide array of alternative sanctions in the states.99 It 
92. Id. at xiv-xv. 
93. Id. at xiii-xv. 
94. Id. at xiv. 
95. In Guidelines commentary, the Commission indicates that it considers nonprison 
sanctions inappropriate for most offenders with a criminal history score of III or above 
because, so far, these offenders have not benefited from criminal justice sanctions, and may 
need to be imprisoned for future deterrence. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.1 
cmt. 7 (2004). 
96. GAO, SENTENCING: INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS, supra note 30, at 59 app. IV. 
97. Id.
98. Another set of justifications indicates the courts’ reluctance to grant probationary 
terms because the offender has benefited from a downward departure, effectively shortening 
her sentence. This rationale may be grounded in retributive thought, while many of the 
others are based on incapacitative considerations and fear of recidivism. Id.
99. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-322, § 50001, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223 
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might be useful to implement some of them as pilot projects in select federal 
districts. The drug-court model, for example, may also be promising for federal 
nonviolent drug and property offenders whose crimes can be ascribed to a drug 
addiction.100 Drug courts currently have a wide array of approaches and 
characteristics. Based on the experience in the states, the federal system should 
be able to fashion a program that is particularly suitable for federal offenders. 
Intermediate sanctions that have been successful abroad may also be 
suitable for federal sentencing. Germany, for example, has had very positive 
experiences with victim-offender mediation, even for violent offenses. Even 
though not all offenders fulfilled all agreed-upon conditions that resulted from 
the mediation, only about five percent failed entirely.101
Community service has not been used extensively in this country, despite 
successes abroad where it has often replaced short prison sentences. 
Community service appears to have public support and a number of 
administrative advantages that make it suitable for increased imposition.102
Fines are also underused in the United States, in contrast to many foreign 
countries where they are considered a serious penalty. Congress may 
reinvigorate experiments with day fines, but on a larger scale than is currently 
conceived.103
For many offenders who pose a limited danger to the public or whose 
crimes are too severe for an alternative sanction, custodial alternatives may be 
most appropriate. Electronic bracelets, community confinement, and halfway 
houses constitute effective options. Intermittent sentences of imprisonment or 
short incarceration periods followed by a probationary period in the community 
(2005)) (authorizing awards of federal grants for drug-court programs). For a description of 
the variety of approaches and success rates, see GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS:
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS (1997). 
100. A 1997 survey showed that almost three quarters of federal inmates had a history 
of illegal drug use, with over half of them having used drugs regularly before incarceration. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRISONER RELEASES: TRENDS AND INFORMATION ON 
REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS 14-15, 14 tbl.4 (2001). For a recent evaluation of the success of 
drug courts in decreasing criminal offending and drug use, see GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, ADULT DRUG COURTS: EVIDENCE INDICATES RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED 
RESULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES (2005), http:www.gao.gov/htext/d05219.html (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2005). 
101. See FED. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR & FED. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 
32-33. See generally HANS-JÜRGEN KERNER & ARTHUR HARTMANN, INSTITUT FÜR 
KRIMINOLOGIE DER UNIVERSITÄT TÜBINGEN, AUSWERTUNG DER BUNDESWEITEN TÄTER-
OPFER-AUSGLEICHS-STATISTIK FÜR DIE JAHRE 1993 BIS 1999 (2003), www.bmj.bund.de/ 
media/archive/517.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
102. Tonry & Lynch, supra note 49, at 124-27 (discussing positive experiences with 
community service). 
103. Id. at 128-31. For further information on day fines, see LAURA WINTERFIELD &
SALLY T. HILLSMAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE STATEN ISLAND DAY-FINES PROJECT:
RESEARCH IN BRIEF (1993); Sally T. Hillsman, Day Fines, in INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN 
OVERCROWDED TIMES (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995). 
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should also be investigated.104
Other offenders constitute no risk to public safety but deserve a substantial 
sentence. For them, a combination of fines, restitution, and community service 
may be most effective. However, the experience of some states should serve as 
a warning. As probation conditions multiply, offenders are more likely to fail. 
Such failure should not lead to the immediate imposition of a prison term. 
North Carolina’s model is instructive, since it provides a list of failures and 
attendant, graduated sanctions for each.105 Especially for addicts, an allowance 
for failure must be built into the system. 
In addition to the sentence itself, a host of collateral sanctions befalls an 
offender, often automatically and without notice, upon conviction. As currently 
configured, such sanctions are inequitable and often counterproductive. They 
could, however, be employed more effectively and equitably in the sanctioning 
process.
II. REFORMING COLLATERAL SANCTIONS INTO SENTENCING ELEMENTS
Collateral sanctions—often referred to as collateral consequences or civil 
disabilities—are not part of the sentence calculus, even though they derive from 
a criminal conviction. Some of them follow automatically upon a conviction; 
others must be imposed by an administrative agency or another regulatory 
body.106 After a period in which collateral sanctions decreased dramatically, 
they have been on the increase in the last two decades.107 They function as 
invisible mandatory minimum sentences, frequently imposed on a vast array of 
offenders without their knowledge and without any recourse. They lack any 
proportionality and negatively impact an offender’s reintegrative efforts.108
Since the 1980s, Congress has substantially increased collateral sanctions, 
104. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 65, at 241-45 (discussing “Custody Plus” and 
intermittent confinement, which are included as sentencing options in the English Criminal 
Justice Bill 2002). 
105. N.C. DEP’T OF CORRECTION, VIOLATIONS POLICIES—PROCEDURES (2002), 
reprinted in NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 528-33 (2004). 
106. For a discussion of some of the differences between collateral sanctions and 
discretionary disabilities, see AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS,
COMMENTARY STANDARD 19-2.1 (2004). For a listing of collateral sanctions in every state, 
see LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY, A REPORT ON STATE 
LEGAL BARRIERS FACING PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS (2004), www.lac.org/lac/upload/ 
lacreport/LAC_PrintReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
107. Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: 
A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION 10, 14-15 (1996) 
(detailing growth of collateral sanctions in the states, in contrast to the pre-1986 period that 
had generally shown declining restrictions on offenders’ civil rights). 
108. See generally INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS 
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Webb Hubbell, Without
Pardon: Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 223 (2001). 
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which frequently target specific offender groups.109 Federal legislation impacts 
not only those convicted in federal courts, but also state offenders because of 
congressional mandates imposed on the states.110 Many of the sanctions 
deprive offenders of “critical ingredients of the support systems of poor people 
in this country.”111 Among those federal reforms is the lifetime ban on welfare 
benefits for drug offenders, which almost half the states enforce in full. It 
prohibits persons convicted of a federal or state felony drug offense from 
receiving cash assistance and food stamps.112 The ban has had the most 
negative impact on women and children.113
Since the 1996 immigration legislation, deportation has become mandatory 
for a host of criminal offenses. In addition, sex offender registration statutes 
exist now in all states. In many states, federal sex offenders must register with 
local law enforcement.114 Federal law also prohibits convicted felons from 
possessing or receiving any firearms or ammunition unless they have had their 
civil rights restored.115
Specific laws targeting only federal offenders have also proliferated. 
Longstanding federal legislation prohibits convicted felons from serving on a 
jury unless their civil rights have been restored, which most courts have 
interpreted to mean that they must have received a presidential pardon.116
Federal statutes also prohibit those convicted of certain felonies from holding 
public office, obtaining federal employment, and receiving military 
commissions.117 A conviction may lead to the loss of federal licenses and 
registrations.118
Select rights may be restored through administrative or judicial action. A 
109. For employment- and licensing-related restrictions, see MARGARET COLGATE 
LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-
BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE 6-11 (2005), http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/rights-restor 
ation/execsumm.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
110. See Travis, supra note 7, at 23. 
111. Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 18 
(Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002). 
112. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-193, § 115(a), 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 862a (2005)); see 
also PATRICIA ALLARD, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE SENTENCES: DENYING WELFARE 
BENEFITS TO WOMEN CONVICTED OF DRUG OFFENSES 1-2 (2002), http://www.sentencing 
project.org/pdfs/9088.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
113. See generally ALLARD, supra note 112. 
114. OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 12 (1996). 
115. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-922 (2005). The restoration exception has triggered substantial 
litigation surrounding state restoration procedures. See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY,
supra note 114, at 14-18. 
116. OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, supra note 114, at 6. 
117. Id. at 6-8. 
118. Id. at 8-9. 
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host of state sanctions can be removed through a restoration of rights under 
state law. For federal offenders, the only possibility of having their civil rights 
restored is through a presidential pardon. Even though the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms is empowered to restore federal firearms privileges, 
Congress has not funded this provision since 1992.119 Other discretionary 
waivers of collateral sanctions may be available from select government 
agencies or through other restoration processes.120 However, federal law lacks 
a statutory restoration procedure and an expungement statute.121 Both have 
become more important as criminal-record checks have played a more 
dominant role in employment decisions in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, as the federal criminal justice system has grown 
exponentially, and as ever greater numbers of individuals have federal records. 
At the same time, the number of presidential pardons has steadily decreased.122
In light of this development, a statutory restoration procedure is crucial, as 
federal offenders are among those with the least ability to be restored to full 
status as a citizen. In addition, the role of collateral sanctions must be 
reconsidered. 
Because of the panoply of state-imposed collateral sanctions that vary 
dramatically, federal convictions have an inherently inequitable impact on 
offenders. Many offenders suffer from a host of sanctions that limit their 
political, social, and economic participation in society, but which do not count 
as part of their punishment. 
All collateral sanctions that hinder an offender’s political participation or 
exclude her from other crucial functions of the modern state should be 
eliminated. These sanctions merely serve to set offenders continually apart 
without providing a tangible benefit.123 Therefore, they hamper the 
reintegration of offenders into society,124 a goal Congress and the President 
119. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2005); see United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 71 (2002). 
120. See LOVE, supra note 109, at 7. 
121. Id. at 4. For very limited expungement provisions in federal law, see id.
122. See Charles Shanor & Marc Miller, Pardon Us: Systematic Presidential Pardons,
13 FED. SENT’G REP. 139 (2001). 
123. The most telling example may be congressional legislation that mandates states to 
impose a lifetime bar on individuals with drug-related felony convictions from receiving 
federally funded public assistance and food stamps. 21 U.S.C. § 862a (2005). About half the 
states have opted out of this provision. See, e.g., Travis, supra note 7, at 23. The most 
dramatic state restriction is disenfranchisement. For recent changes to disenfranchisement 
provisions, see MARC MAUER & TUSHAR KANSAL, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, BARRED FOR 
LIFE: VOTING RIGHTS RESTORATION IN PERMANENT DISENFRANCHISEMENT STATES (2005), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/barredforlife.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
124. See, e.g., Mark M. Stavsky, No Guns or Butter for Thomas Bean: Firearms 
Disabilities and Their Occupational Consequences, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1759 (2003). 
Many bans, such as disenfranchisement, also impact communities negatively. See, e.g., Marc 
Mauer, Political Report: Disenfranchising Felons Hurts Entire Communities, FOCUS,
May/June 2004, at 5, 5-6. 
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have declared to be crucial.125
Some collateral sanctions appear risk-based. They do not rely on individual 
risk assessments but instead categorize offenders into large, overinclusive 
groups. Often they impose harsh additional sanctions on those who are not 
dangerous, unnecessarily restricting offenders’ lives while draining limited 
enforcement resources. 
Even worse criminal justice policy concerns non-risk-based sanctions, 
which the Supreme Court has ruled constitutionally permissible.126 These 
sanctions dilute enforcement efforts and ban nondangerous offenders from 
reentering society fully. Individualized risk-based collateral sanctions, and 
those with a retributive component, should be imposed at sentencing and 
factored into the sentence. This initiative would accomplish two goals: it would 
appropriately focus sanctions on dangerous offenders,127 and it would convert 
collateral sanctions into part of the penalty. All substantial collateral sanctions 
should be imposed at sentencing, as are the denial of benefits and the 
employment restriction under the Guidelines.128
Currently, non-risk-based and collateral sanctions are rarely used, in part 
because judges consider them ineffective or overly punitive.129 As they are not 
integrated into the Guidelines scheme, judges may not consider them when 
fashioning a sentence. Like nonprison sanctions, which can be integrated into a 
guidelines framework, collateral sanctions can be converted into elements of a 
sentence and become an integral part of a guidelines regime. 
First, many collateral sanctions apply only to certain types of offenders. 
Once the Sentencing Commission has determined their function, it can turn 
them into a probation condition, or treat them as a separate, additional sanction 
125. See, e.g., Second Chance Act, S. Res. 2789, 108th Cong. (2004); President 
George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union 
(Jan. 20, 2004), www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=current_event&code=bush_ad 
min&year=2004 (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
126. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003). 
127. Even though risk assessment remains an area fraught with difficulties, the 
actuarial model which consists of group-based risk assessment, especially when combined 
with individualized clinical assessments, has proven very promising. See, e.g., Nora V. 
Demleitner, Risk Assessment: Promises and Pitfalls, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 161 (2004); Eric 
S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment: How a 
Developing Science Can Enhance Accuracy and Accountability, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 176 
(2004); Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with 
Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443 
(2003); Witt & Barone, supra note 53. 
128. For examples of such models, see Nora V. Demleitner, Abusing State Power or 
Controlling Risk?: Sex Offender Commitment and Sicherungsverwahrung, 30 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1621 (2003); Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One’s Debt to Society: 
The German Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753 
(2000).
129. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5F1.6 (2004); see also Musser Jr., supra
note 27, at 255. 
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that must be considered in fashioning an overall sentence. Risk-based collateral 
sanctions may be most effective when combined with nonprison sanctions that 
lead to the release of offenders who might constitute a slightly higher risk than 
would otherwise be acceptable. The Commission should be tasked to assess the 
impact such sanctions may have on recidivism. It should also regularly 
determine how frequently used and how useful certain sanctions are. 
Second, many currently enforced collateral sanctions are endless or can 
only be terminated upon a restoration of civil rights. Under a guidelines regime 
that converts collateral sanctions into a sentence component, these new 
sanctions will be limited in time, as is all other punishment. 
Third, courts should be given discretion as to whether to impose collateral 
sanctions. The most dramatic change would occur in the immigration area, 
where federal courts would have to determine at sentencing whether an 
offender should be deported. This discretion would allow them to make 
individualized judgments and factor deportation into the overall sentence they 
impose. Alternatively, for some legally difficult additional sanctions, 
administrative agencies and tribunals might be better suited than the traditional 
court. However, in those cases, courts should be in a position to issue strong 
recommendations to such agencies, so as to indicate whether they considered 
these additional sanctions in the imposition of the sentence. 
CONCLUSION
In their rush toward greater imprisonment, Congress and the Sentencing 
Commission have neglected nonprison sentences and failed to consider 
collateral sanctions in their punishment calculus. Even in a Guidelines world, 
imprisonment does not have to be the default, as some state guidelines regimes 
teach us. Nonprison sanctions and collateral sanctions can be successfully 
integrated into a guidelines framework so as to create greater sentence equality 
and uniformity, to function as an effective deterrent, and to protect public 
safety. Even though many will perceive them as less retributive than 
imprisonment, these alternative sanctions are the only viable solution to 
counteract the negative consequences resulting from large-scale imprisonment. 
